Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns: A Fiscal Explanation by Priyank Gandhi & Hanno Lustig
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










The authors thank Viral Acharya, Martin Bodenstein, Markus Brunnermeier, John Campbell, John
Cochrane, Ron Feldman, Cesare Fracassi, Etienne Gagnon, Mark Garmaise, Mark Grinblatt, Jennifer
Huang, John Krainer, Arvind Krishnamurthy, David Laibson, Jonathan Parker, Lasse Pedersen, Andrea
Raffo, Richard Roll, Jan Schneider, Martin Schneider, Clemens Sialm, Rob Vishny, and Skander Vandenheuvel
for detailed and helpful comments, as well as seminar participants at UT Austin, Chicago Booth, NYU
Stern, Harvard Economics, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, and the Society for Economic Dynamics 2010 Annual Meeting in Montreal, and the
2010 Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics. The views expressed herein are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Priyank Gandhi and Hanno Lustig. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns: A Fiscal Explanation
Priyank Gandhi and Hanno Lustig
NBER Working Paper No. 16553
November 2010, Revised January 2012
JEL No. G01,G12
ABSTRACT
The largest commercial bank stocks, measured by book value, have significantly lower risk-adjusted
returns than small- and medium-sized bank stocks, even though large banks are significantly more
levered. We find a size factor in the component of bank returns that is orthogonal to the standard risk
factors. This size factor, which has the right covariance with bank returns to explain the average risk-adjusted
returns, measures size-dependent exposure in banks to bank-specific tail risk. The variation in exposure
can be attributed to differences in the financial disaster recovery rates between small and large banks.
A general equilibrium model with rare bank disasters can match these alphas in a sample without disasters
provided that the difference in disaster recovery rates between the largest and smallest banks is 35
cents per dollar of dividends.
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hlustig@anderson.ucla.eduBanks are diﬀerent from non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in many ways. One of the most salient distinctions
is that banks are subject to bank runs during banking panics and crises, not just by depositors,
but also by other creditors (see Gorton and Metrick (2009) and Duﬃe (2010)). Because ﬁnancial
crises are high marginal utility states for the average investor, the expected return on bank stocks
should be especially sensitive to variation in the anticipated ﬁnancial disaster recovery rates of
bank shareholders related to bank size, the regulatory regime, implicit government guarantees and
other characteristics. For example, if a bank is deemed too-big-to-fail, its expected return would
be lower in equilibrium than that of smaller banks holding the exact same assets in their portfolio,
as the government absorb some of the large bank’s tail risk. We ﬁnd evidence that the pricing of
bank-speciﬁc tail risk held in ﬁnancial markets depends on all of these bank characteristics.
To explore the asset pricing implications of ﬁnancial disasters, our paper studies historical bank
stock returns in the U.S. We ﬁnd that there is a size eﬀect in bank stock returns that is diﬀerent
from the market capitalization eﬀects that have been documented in non-ﬁnancial stock returns
(see Banz (1981) and many others). All else equal, a 100% increase in a bank’s book value lowers its
annual return by 2.45% per annum. For non-ﬁnancial stocks, there is no similar relation between
book value and returns (Berk (1997)).
These return diﬀerences cannot be imputed to diﬀerences in standard risk exposure. A long
position in the stock portfolio of largest commercial banks, measured by deciles of total book value,
and a short position in the stock portfolio of the smallest banks under-performs an equally risky
portfolio of all (non-bank) stocks and government and corporate bonds by more than 5.85% per
annum. The average alphas are large and positive for commercial banks in the ﬁrst ﬁve deciles
and then decrease for the largest banks in the top three deciles.
Small banks diﬀer from large banks in many ways, but these diﬀerences should not lead to
diﬀerences in average risk-adjusted returns on bank portfolios unless there is bank-speciﬁc tail risk
that is priced but not spanned by the traded returns on other stocks in the sample. We found
evidence of such a risk factor in bank stock returns: The second principal component (p.c.) of
the risk-adjusted returns on size-sorted portfolios of commercial banks is a size factor that has the
3exactly the right covariance with the portfolio returns to account for most of this pricing anomaly.
By construction, this size factor is orthogonal to the stock and bond risk factors.
This size portfolio, determined by the second p.c., which goes long in small bank stocks and
short in large bank stocks, loses an average of 61 cents during NBER (National Bureau of Economic
Research) recessions per dollar invested at the start, after hedging out exposure to standard stock
and bond risk. We attribute the cyclical banking size factor in the data to size-dependent diﬀerences
in the perceived shareholder recovery rates on these bank portfolios during ﬁnancial disasters.
In a version of the Barro (2006), Rietz (1988) and Longstaﬀ and Piazzesi (2004) asset pricing
model with a time-varying probability of rare events, developed by Gabaix (2008), Wachter (2008),
and Gourio (2008), ﬁnancial disasters which disproportionately impact bank cash ﬂows contribute
an additional bank-speciﬁc risk factor. These rare events are priced into expected returns on
portfolios of banks, but are not fully spanned by the returns on other assets in a small sample.
A general equilibrium version of our model that is calibrated to match the equity premium can
match the average alphas in a sample without disasters if the ﬁnancial disaster recovery rate is 35
cents higher for large banks, in line with the failure rate of banks in the lowest decile during the
latest crisis.
Historically, the probability of a ﬁnancial disaster increases during recessions. Because of the
size-contingent nature of the the recovery rate for bank stockholders in case of a ﬁnancial disaster,
the variation in the probability of a ﬁnancial disaster generates a common business cycle factor in
the normal-risk-adjusted returns of size-sorted bank stock portfolios; the loadings of bank stock
portfolio returns on this size factor are determined by the recovery rates and hence by size. Small
banks have positive loadings while large banks have negative loadings. As the probability of a
ﬁnancial disaster increases, the expected return gap between small and large banks grows.
Shareholder recovery rates for banks depend on size. During ﬁnancial disasters, large banks fare
much better, even though they are more levered than their smaller counterparts. A total of 30% of
publicly traded commercial banks in the ﬁrst size decile were delisted in 2009 alone although there
were none in the last decile. During the recent U.S. ﬁnancial crisis, the size portfolio of commercial
4banks, hedged against exposure to commercial banks, lost 90 cents per dollar invested at the start
of the crisis, while the same hedged size portfolio of all banks lost all of its value during the Great
Depression.
To back out the implicit ﬁnancial tail risk premium or discount charged by the shareholders
of commercial banks, we multiply the loadings on the size factor by its market risk price. The
implicit insurance provided against ﬁnancial disaster risk lowers the expected equity return for
the largest U.S. commercial banks by 3.10%, but the additional exposure to bank-speciﬁc tail risk
increases the expected return on the smallest bank stocks by 3.25%, compared to a portfolio of
non-bank stocks and bonds with the same standard risk characteristics. The largest banks have an
average market capitalization of $152 bn in 2005 dollars.1 For the largest commercial banks, this
amounts to an annual savings of $4.71 bn per bank. The market imposes large ﬁnancial tail risk
‘subsidies’ (‘taxes’) on large (small) bank stocks compared to a portfolio of stocks and bonds with
the same observed risk proﬁle. There is direct evidence from option markets: Kelly, Lustig, and
Nieuwerburgh (2011) ﬁnd that out-of-the-money put options on large banks were cheap during the
crisis.
The pricing of ﬁnancial tail risk depends not only on bank size. We relate the ﬁnancial disaster
premium of banks to the regulatory regime. Commercial banks, who have access to the discount
window and beneﬁt from deposit insurance, and Government-sponsored enterprises (GSE), who
beneﬁt from an explicit guarantee, are imputed a large ﬁnancial tail risk subsidy while investment
and foreign banks are not. On the other hand, hedge funds are imputed a ﬁnancial tail risk tax,
just like small banks.
After the repeal of key provisions in the Glass-Steagall Banking Act in 1999, we ﬁnd large
across-the-board increases in the size of the subsidy for large commercial, investment banks and
GSE. For example, the Fannie Mae subsidy tripled to 6.57% in 2000-2005. This period also
coincides with the dramatic growth in securitization, which allows ﬁnancial institutions to beneﬁt
from the collective bailout option more aggressively by eliminating idiosyncratic risk exposure (see
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2008) for a clear description of this eﬀect of securitization).
1This number only includes the market capitalization of the commercial bank, not the bank holding company.
5Furthermore, we provide a direct link to bailouts; we show that the ﬁnancial disaster subsidy of
the largest 10 banks increases immediately after bailout announcements. O’Hara and Shaw (1990)
document large positive wealth eﬀects for shareholders of banks who were declared ‘too-big-to-fail’
by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1984, and negative wealth eﬀects for those banks that were
not included. Consistent with this, we document large increases in the implicit ﬁnancial disaster
subsidy to these too-big-to-failbanks after this announcement, and six other bailout announcements
prior to the recent ﬁnancial crisis that were identiﬁed by Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000). Furthermore,
we ﬁnd large increases after announcements that beneﬁted large banks during the recent ﬁnancial
crisis as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section discusses the related literature.
In Section II we construct portfolios of commercial U.S. bank stocks sorted by size. Section III
describes the size eﬀect in bank stock returns. Section IV establishes that there is a pro-cyclical
size factor in the normal-risk-adjusted returns of these portfolios. Section V relates the pricing of
bank tail risk to government announcements and the regulatory environment. We use a calibrated
version of the model to back out the implied diﬀerences in recovery rates in section VI. Section
VII concludes.
I Related Literature
There is obviously a large literature on size eﬀects in stock returns (see Banz (1981), Basu (1983),
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993), Fama and French (1993), Berk (1995) and others), but
most of these papers actually do not include ﬁnancial stocks, presumably because of their high
leverage. Our paper is the ﬁrst to document that the size eﬀect in ﬁnancial stocks is really about
size, rather than market capitalization. We attribute the size eﬀect to how tail risk is priced in
ﬁnancial stocks.
There is direct evidence from option markets that tail risk in the ﬁnancial sector is priced
diﬀerently. Kelly, Lustig, and Nieuwerburgh (2011) ﬁnd that the out-of-the-money index put
options of bank stocks were relatively cheap during the recent crisis, as a consequence of the
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Prilmeier, and Stulz (2011) document that those banks which incurred substantial losses during
previous crises were more likely to incur losses during the recent crisis. If some banks beneﬁt from
a larger perceived tail risk subsidy, they have an incentive to load up on this type of risk risk. In
fact, shareholder value maximization requires that they do so, as pointed out by Panageas (2010a)
who analyzes optimal risk management in the presence of guarantees. Interestingly, Fahlenbrach
and Stulz (2011) ﬁnd some evidence that banks whose managers’ interests were more aligned with
shareholders actually performed worse during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Our work contributes to the important task of measuring systemic risk in the ﬁnancial sec-
tor. Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) and
Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2011) develop novel methods for measuring systemic risk. Our measure
of the banking tail risk premium is determined by the bank’s loading on the size factor, which
gauges a ﬁrm’s systemic risk exposure. Firms that are deemed systemically important have large
negative loadings on the size factor, because these are less likely to be allowed to fail in the event
of a ﬁnancial disaster, and they trade at a premium as a result. As far as we know, our paper is
the ﬁrst to link the subsidy that accrues to banks who are deemed systemically important with
exposure to systemic risk. To the extent that these diﬀerences in bank tail risk pricing are directly
attributable to government policies, they are an ex ante measure of the distortion created by the
implicit guarantee extended to some U.S. ﬁnancial institutions.2
Why study the eﬀect of bailouts on bank equity? The anticipation of future bailouts of bond-
holders and other creditors always beneﬁts shareholders (see Kareken and Wallace (1978)) ex ante.
Furthermore, during the crisis, there may be massive uncertainty about the resolution regime,
especially for large ﬁnancial institutions. As a result, government guarantees will inevitably tend
to beneﬁt shareholders ex post as well. Clearly, the U.S. government and regulators are willing to
let small banks fail, not so for large banks. Of course, ex ante, one could have expected that the
2Estimating the entire ex post, realized cost of the various measures implemented by the U.S. Treasury, the
Federal Reserve system, the FDIC and other regulators in the face of the recent crisis is hard. Veronesi and Zingales
(2010) estimate the cost to be between $21 and $44 billion, with a beneﬁt of more than $86 billion.
7government would wipe out shareholders of large ﬁnancial institutions in case of a bailout.3Our ev-
idence suggests that this is not what market participants expected. A number of events have been
important in creating and sustaining the too-big-too fail perception in the market. Among these
are the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s intervention to prevent the failure of Continental
Illinois National Bank in 1984, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
and the Federal Reserve’s intervention in 1998 to save Long Term Capital Management.
Finally, our ﬁndings suggests that cost of capital distortions might have contributed to the pre-
crisis growth in the size of the ﬁnancial sector relative to the overall economy. Philippon (2008)
has argued that much of the variation in the size of the U.S. ﬁnancial sector can be imputed to
standard corporate ﬁnance forces. However, he notes the 2002-2007 period as an exception, which
is exactly when we measure the largest distortions.
II Size Eﬀect in Bank Stock Returns.
This section reports the returns on size-sorted portfolios of bank stocks. We also show the results
of a cross-sectional regression of returns on ﬁrm characteristics that conﬁrms the portfolio results.
II.1 Data
We collect data on equity returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for
all ﬁrms with Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes 60, 61, and 62. The data starts in
January 1970 and ends in December 2009. Firms with these SIC codes are deﬁned as commercial
banks, non-depository credit institutions, and investment banks respectively. Henceforth, we refer
to commercial banks, credit institutions, and investment banks collectively as banks. We exclude
data for all ﬁnancial ﬁrms that are inactive and/or not incorporated in the U.S., and we also
3The key to activating the collective bailout clause is common variation in bank payoﬀs. In a recent paper,
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) and Farhi and Tirole (2009) explore the incentives for banks in this type of en-
vironment to seek exposure to similar risk factors. The government’s guarantee creates complementarities in ﬁrm
payoﬀs. In earlier work, Schneider and Tornell (2004) explain the currency mismatch on ﬁrm balance sheets in
emerging markets endogenously by means of a bailout guarantee for the non-tradeables sector. Ranciere and Tor-
nell (2011) discuss how to design regulation in the context of government bailout guarantees. Panageas (2010b)
explores the optimal taxation implications of bailouts.
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by regulations applicable both in the country of operation and the country of incorporation. Since
these policies vary across countries, our focus on ﬁnancial ﬁrms operating and incorporated inside
the U.S. ensures that all ﬁrms in our analysis are subject to a uniform regulatory regime.
We start by focusing on portfolios of commercial bank stocks. We employ the standard portfolio
formation strategy of Fama and French (1993). We rank all bank stocks by market capitalization
as of January of each year. The stocks are then allocated to 10 portfolios based on their market
capitalization. We calculate value-weighted returns for each portfolio for each month over the next
year. At the end of this exercise, we have monthly value-weighted returns for each size-sorted
portfolio of banks.
While the CRSP data are available from 1926, our main sample only begins only in 1970 for
banks, as there are not enough publicly traded commercial banks prior to 1970. Only a small
fraction of all banks that operate in the U.S. are publicly listed. For instance, for the years 2000
to 2008, data are available from CRSP for approximately 630 banks, as compared to more than
7000 FDIC-insured banks operating in the U.S. over the same period. However, the largest 600
banks control more than 88% of all commercial bank assets in the U.S. Most of these large banks
are publicly listed. To the extent that small banks that are not publicly listed are very diﬀerent
from those that are, some of our results need to be qualiﬁed.
We also use book value data from the CRSP-Compustat merged data-set. While our market
capitalization results are based on 15,536 bank-years, the book-value results are based on only
12,556 bank-years. The reduction in the number of banks is primarily due to missing balance sheet
data in the CRSP-Compustat merged data-set.
II.2 Summary Statistics
Table I reports the total market capitalization of banks in each of 10 size-sorted portfolio as a
fraction of the total market capitalization of the banking sector in January of each year. The
numbers are reported in percentages. We also report the the average number of banks in the
9portfolio.
Panel A in Table I shows that during the 1970 - 1980 subsample the smallest banks (those in
portfolio 1) on average represented just 0.36% of the total market capitalization of all commercial
banks, as compared to 49.78% represented by the largest banks (those in portfolio 10). During
any year between 1970 and 1980, the banks in portfolio 1 at most accounted for 0.57% of the total
market capitalization of the commercial banking sector.
Table I clearly shows the increasing concentration of the U.S commercial banking sector. The
top 10% of banks account for nearly 50% of the total sector market capitalization in the 70s while
they account for more than 90% during the 2000-2009; nearly 84% of this accounted for by the
largest 1/2 in this group. In any given year between 1970 and 1980, there are at least 9 banks per
size-sorted portfolio, which increases to 62 banks for any year between 2000 and 2009.
Panel B of Table I reports the total book value of banks in each size-sorted portfolio as a
fraction of the total asset value of the banking sector in January of each year. Total book value
is the better measure of size. These results are very close to those obtained by sorting on market
capitalization. We also report leverage. Leverage is computed as total book value divided by the
book value of equity. Bank leverage clearly increases with bank size. Between 1980 and 1990, the
average leverage in the ﬁrst decile is 13.55, and it gradually increases to 22.37 in the last decile.
We document the same pattern in subsequent decades.
[Table 1 about here.]
II.3 Returns on Commercial Bank Stock Portfolios
When we report portfolio return averages, we exclude the recent ﬁnancial crisis, as we consider
samples that exclude realizations of the rare events in the model. However, the results that we
report are quite robust to extending the sample.
Table II provides mean returns for the size-sorted portfolios of banks over the 1970-2005 sample.
In panel A, the stocks are sorted into deciles by market capitalization. The mean monthly returns
for all portfolios are annualized by multiplying by 12 and are expressed in percentages. The last
10column reports the diﬀerence in mean annual returns between portfolio 10 and portfolio 1. Over
the entire sample, a portfolio that goes long in a basket of large banks and short in a basket of
small banks on average loses 4.47% per annum. The average returns on the ﬁrst (last) portfolio
are 17.47% (13.01%). There is a monotonic decline in average returns from the ﬁrst to the last
portfolio.
Market cap measures size, but it also measures expected returns. Firms which generate more
cash ﬂows will tend to have higher market cap, but ﬁrms with lower expected returns, holding cash
ﬂows constant, also have larger market capitalization. As a result, Berk (1995) argues that there
should be a relation between expected returns and market capitalization. Of course, this argument
does not apply to other measures of size such as book value. A priori, there is no reason to expect
a relation between book values and expected returns.
In Panel B of Table II, we sort stocks into deciles by total book value. The pattern in realized
returns is quite diﬀerent. There is an inverted U-shaped pattern. The average returns between
1980 and 2005 increase from 16% in the ﬁrst portfolio to 21.75% in the sixth portfolio, and then
decline to 13.68% in the last portfolio. The diﬀerence between the sixth and the 10th portfolio is
8.07% per annum. This is remarkable because the largest commercial banks are more levered than
medium-sized banks, and hence, if anything, one would expect to see the opposite pattern.
[Table 2 about here.]
II.4 Characteristics Regression
The portfolio results in table II suggest there is a negative relation between total book value
and returns for commercial banks, at least for the largest banks. We investigated this relation
in the 1970-2005 sample. When we run a cross-sectional regression of average annual returns on
ﬁrm characteristics: the log of market capitalization, the log of book value, book-to-market, and
leverage, we obtain a large and signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient for log book value (-2.45) and a
positive coeﬃcient for market capitalization (2.76). These coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. The detailed results are in the appendix in section C.
11This pooled regression explains 0.38% of the variation in annual returns. Thus a 100% increase
in book value above the sample average lowers annual returns by 245 bps for a typical bank, holding
all variables, including market capitalization, ﬁxed. Leverage and book-to-market ratio seem to
have no additional explanatory power for returns. We obtain identical results when we exclude
leverage and book-to-market ratios from the regression. When we drop book value, the regression
only accounts for 0.004% of the variation in annual returns. Hence, this size eﬀect in bank stock
returns is very diﬀerent from the market capitalization eﬀect ﬁrst documented by Banz (1981).
II.5 Returns on size-sorted portfolios of non-ﬁnancials.
What we usually refer to as a size eﬀect is really a market capitalization eﬀect in most industries.
Berk (1997) points out that there is only a moderate size eﬀect in the raw returns of non-ﬁnancials
when size is measured by book value rather than market capitalization. The same conclusion
applies when other measures of actual ﬁrm size are used, such as the number of employees (Berk
(1997)). When we perform the same sorting exercise using book values for non-ﬁnancials, we do
not ﬁnd similar patterns.
Panel A of Table III reports the average returns on portfolios of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms sorted by
market capitalization. The average returns on ﬁrms in the ﬁrst decile of market capitalization are
high (24.51%). These small cap stocks have smaller market capitalization than the smallest banks,
are highly illiquid and hence earn much higher expected returns. Between the second and the tenth
portfolio, average returns gradually decline from 15.76% to 11.39%.
The book-sorting results are reported in Panel B of Table III. Between 1970 and 2005, the
average returns in the ﬁrst decile are 276 bps higher than the average returns in the last portfolio.
The average returns on the the ﬁrst portfolio are 16.05% per annum. Returns increase to 16.75%
in the second portfolio and subsequently decrease to 13.29% in the last portfolio. The diﬀerence
between the sixth and the tenth portfolio is only 2.10 % per annum (compared to 8.07% for
non-ﬁnancials).
[Table 3 about here.]
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turns
We start by adjusting the portfolio returns for exposure to the standard risk factors that explain
cross-sectional variation in average returns on other portfolios of non-ﬁnancial stocks and bonds.
We do so by comparing the performance of the bank portfolio to the performance of a portfolio of
non-bank stocks with the same exposure to normal risk factors.
A bank manages a portfolio of bonds of varying maturities and credit risk.4 Therefore, we also




market smb hml ltg crd
 
, (1)
is 5 × 1. market, smb, and hml represent the returns on the three Fama-French stock factors:
the market, small minus big, and high minus low respectively. The Fama/French factors are
constructed using the 6 value-weight portfolios of all stocks on NYSE, AMEX And NASDAQ
(including ﬁnancials) formed on size and book-to-market. market is the value-weight return on all
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from
Ibbotson Associates). We use ltg to denote the excess returns on an index of 10-year bonds issued
by the U.S. Treasury as our ﬁrst bond risk factor. The USA 10-year Government Bond Total
Return Index (ltg) is downloadable from Global Financial Data. In addition, active participation
by banks in markets for commercial, industrial, and consumer loans exposes them to credit risk. We
use crd to denote the excess returns on an index of investment grade corporate bonds, maintained
by Dow Jones, as our second bond risk factor. To compute excess returns, we use the one-month
risk-free rate.5
4Longstaﬀ and Myers (2009) also show that banks can be treated as active managers of ﬁxed income portfolios.
5Data for the risk-free rate and the Fama-French factors was collected from Kenneth French’s website. The Dow
Jones Corporate Bond Return Index (crd) is downloadable from Global Financial Data.
13III.1 Returns on Commercial Bank Stock Portfolios
We regress monthly excess returns for each size-sorted portfolio on the three Fama-French factors
and two bond factors. For each portfolio i we run the following time-series regression to estimate











t+1 is the monthly return on the ith size-sorted portfolio. Since all of the risk factors in
ft are traded returns, the estimated residuals in the time series regression are estimates of the
normal-risk-adjusted returns   Ri
t+1.
Table IV provides the results of the regression speciﬁed in equation (2). Panel A reports the
results based on sorting by market capitalization. The table reports the regression coeﬃcients for
each size-sorted portfolio, along with their statistical signiﬁcance and the adjusted R2. Table IV
excludes the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The estimated intercepts decrease nearly monotonically with
bank size from 5.45% for the ﬁrst portfolio to -2.53% for the tenth portfolio. The implicit risk
prices for the factors ft =
 





5.80 0.88 6.62 2.92 4.01
 
.
A long-short position that goes long one dollar in a portfolio of the largest market capitalization
banks and short one dollar in a portfolio of the smallest market capitalization banks loses 7.97%
over the non-disaster sample. This return spread is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
average normal-risk-adjusted return on a 9-minus-2 position is -6.62% per annum, and -3.95% per
annum for the 8-minus-3 portfolio. These are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% and the 5% level
respectively. The diﬀerences in risk-adjusted portfolio returns tend to be larger than the diﬀerences
in raw portfolio returns, because larger banks are more levered and hence impute higher market
betas to large bank stock portfolios. The market beta increases from 0.36 for the ﬁrst decile to
1.07 in the last decile. However, this eﬀect is attenuated by the lower credit risk exposure for the
14larger banks.
The second row of Table IV reports the coeﬃcient on excess market return, market, for each
size-sorted portfolio. The market beta increases monotonically with bank size. Over the entire
sample, a portfolio of large banks has a market β of 1.07, as compared to a β of 0.36 for a portfolio
of the smallest banks. The largest banks were 2.9 times more exposed to market risk as compared
to the smallest banks. This diﬀerence can be attributed to diﬀerences in leverage.
The loadings on smb and hml also depend systematically on size. We ﬁrst look at the exposure
to the size factor. Contrary to what one expects to ﬁnd, over the entire sample, the loading on
smbt+1 actually increases from 0.39 for the ﬁrst portfolio to 0.50 for the ﬁfth portfolio, and then
it drops to -0.03 for the tenth portfolio. Clearly, the common variation in stock returns of banks
along the size dimension is very diﬀerent from that in other industries. The same pattern holds
true for the loadings on hml which increase from 0.32 for the ﬁrst portfolio to 0.42 for the last
portfolio.
There is a clear size pattern in the loadings on the bond risk factors as well. ltg, the slope
coeﬃcient on the excess return on an index of 10-year bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury, is
negative and statistically insigniﬁcant for small banks and is positive and almost always statistically
signiﬁcant for large banks. The loadings vary monotonically in size. A $1 long position in large
banks and a $1 short position in small banks results in a net exposure of 30 cents to long-term
government bonds over the entire sample. On the other hand, the loadings on the credit risk
factor, crd, are surprisingly small for large banks and positive for small banks. A long-large-banks-
short-small-banks position delivers a net negative exposure to credit markets of 38 cents per dollar
invested.
[Table 4 about here.]
Panel B reports the results obtained by sorting by book value. The pattern in risk-adjusted
returns is diﬀerent from the one obtained when sorting by the market capitalization of banks. The
risk-adjusted returns remain around 400 bps for the ﬁrst six portfolios. The seventh portfolio posts
average risk-adjusted returns of 212 bps. After that, the the average risk-adjusted returns decline
15to -139 bps for portfolio 8, -317 bps for portfolio 9, and - 256 bps for portfolio 10. A long-short
position that goes long one dollar in a portfolio of the largest banks and short one dollar in a
portfolio of the smallest banks loses 5.85% over the non-disaster sample. This return spread is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The average normal-risk-adjusted return on a 9-minus-
2 position is -7.15% per annum, and -6.30% per annum for the 8-minus-3 portfolio. These are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
Larger banks have higher market betas, consistent with leverage increasing in size, although
the increase is smaller than the diﬀerence in leverage suggests. However, the negative eﬀect of
higher market betas on risk-adjusted returns is partly oﬀset by a strong inverse U-shaped pattern
in the credit risk loading. The loading increases from 0.06 in the ﬁrst portfolio to 0.43 in the ﬁfth
portfolio, and then it declines to 0.07 in the tenth portfolio.
III.2 Returns on Portfolios of Non-ﬁnancial Stocks
Table V provides the results of the regression speciﬁed in equation (2) for non-ﬁnancials sorted
by market capitalization (Panel A) and book value (Panel B). The table reports the regression
coeﬃcients for each size-sorted portfolio along with their statistical signiﬁcance and the adjusted
R2. Table IV excludes the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
In the top panel, stocks with market capitalization in the lowest decile earn much higher risk-
adjusted returns. This is not surprising. These small cap stocks are typically highly illiquid
stocks. It has been documented that illiquid stocks earn abnormal returns (see, e.g., Brennan and
Subrahmanyam (1996)). However, these are stocks with very small market capitalization, which
are much smaller than the banks in the ﬁrst portfolio. In 1980, the average market capitalization
of a ﬁrm in the ﬁrst portfolio is only $22.8 million, compared to $75.9 million for the banks in the
ﬁrst portfolio in 1980. The average market capitalization in the second portfolio is much larger ($
65.7 million in 1980). Other than this illiquidity eﬀect in the ﬁrst decile, the risk-adjusted returns
are small and statistically insigniﬁcant. In Panel B, we sort by book values. While smaller ﬁrms
seem to earn higher risk-adjusted returns, the eﬀects do not exceed 300 bps, and are statistically
16insigniﬁcant.
[Table 5 about here.]
III.3 Robustness
These results are robust. First, we checked the robustness of our results by building three portfolios
of all banks, including investment banks, sorted by market capitalization, starting in 1927. This
is when the CRSP data starts. There are only a few banks in each portfolio at the start of the
sample in 1927. Over the entire 1927-2009 sample, the banks in the ﬁrst portfolio earned 5.48%
per annum more than banks in the last portfolio after adjusting for exposure to the same ﬁve stock
and bond risk factors.
Second, we also split the 1970-2005 benchmark sample to check the stability of our results.
In particular, we want to make sure that our results are not driven by the banking merger and
acquisition wave of the 1990’s. In fact, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in the normal-risk-adjusted
returns are fairly constant throughout our 1970-2005 sample.
Third, when we extend the sample to include the recent ﬁnancial crisis (1970-2009), we obtain
a 778 bps spread in risk-adjusted returns on commercial bank portfolios between the ﬁrst and the
last market decile. This spread is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Hence, our ﬁndings are
quite robust.
IV Size Factor in Bank Stock Returns
The second principal component of normal-risk-adjusted returns on size-sorted portfolios of bank
stocks has loadings that depend monotonically on size. The covariance between the returns on
size-sorted portfolios of banks stocks and the size factor can explain the size pattern in average
risk-adjusted returns. In the next section, we interpret this slope factor in normal-risk-adjusted
returns as a measure of ﬁnancial tail risk.
17IV.1 Constructing the Size Factor
We compute the residuals from the time series regression of returns of each size-sorted portfolio
on the equity and bond risk factor in 2. We extract the loadings for the principal components
(w1,w2) and we report the results in Table VI. This table only shows the loadings for the ﬁrst
two principal components. The other eight are plotted in ﬁgure 1. Together, these two principal
components explain 66% of the residual variation over the entire sample.
The ﬁrst two columns in the Table shows results for market capitalization sorts; the last two
columns show results for book sorts. They are very similar. We focus on the results obtained using
the market capitalization sort, mainly because this sort provides more observations.
The ﬁrst principal component is a banking industry (’level’) factor with roughly equal weights on
all 10 portfolios. The second principal component is a size factor that loads positively on portfolios
of small banks and negatively on portfolios of large banks. The loadings vary monotonically in size.
This is a candidate risk factor because the loadings align with the average normal-risk-adjusted
returns that we want to explain.
[Table 6 about here.]
Next, we take our (T × 10) matrix of estimated residuals, ǫt, and multiply it by the (10 × 10)
loadings of the principal components, to construct the asset pricing factors. The weights (w1,w2)
are re-normalized to (  w1,   w2) so that they sum to 1.6 This results in a (T ×10) linear combination
of the residuals. We focus on the ﬁrst two principal components, denoted PC1
t =   w
′
1ǫt and
PC2,t =   w
′
2ǫt.
The size factor not only has an appealing macro-economic interpretation, but it also is a natural
candidate for explaining the size pattern in normal-risk-adjusted returns, because the average
normal-risk-adjusted returns align with the covariance between the size factor (second principal
component) and the returns on the portfolios. This is not the case for any of the other principal
6w2 is given by:
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.
18components, as is clear from Figure 1. This ﬁgure plots the average normal-risk-adjusted returns
(labeled x) against the covariance of that return with the n-th principal component (labeled o).
The second principal component is the only candidate factor, because the second p.c. is the only
one for which the covariances line up with the average excess returns, suggesting that the common
variation in banks stock returns captured by the second principal component can explain the size
anomaly in bank stock returns.
[Figure 1 about here.]
To check whether the size factor actually explains the average normal-risk-adjusted returns,
we deﬁne a new independent variable. We take the (T × 10) matrix of returns for each of the
size-sorted portfolio of banks and multiply this by the (10 × 1) loading of the second principal
component. We re-normalize the loadings of the second principal component so that they sum
to one. As above, we use   w2 to denote the re-normalized weights. Then: R[PC2]t+1 =   w2Rt
denotes the results of our multiplication and is a (T × 1) vector of the returns weighted by the
second principal component. Thus for each month, the returns of each of the 10 portfolios are
multiplied by their corresponding weights in the second principal component and added together.
This portfolio is long in small banks and short in large banks. The weights of the portfolio are
given by the second principal component loadings, re-normalized to sum to one. We then run
a time-series regression of the returns on the size-sorted bank portfolios on the equity and bond












The tail-and-normal-risk-adjusted returns or α’s from this regression are presented in Panel A of
Table VII. The risk-adjusted returns on all portfolios are smaller than 250 bps over the entire
sample. The average risk-adjusted return on the long-short position is reduced to 20 bps. Not
only does the magnitude of the alphas change, but all of them are statistically insigniﬁcant. In
addition, there is no discernible size-related pattern in these normal-risk-adjusted returns.
19[Table 7 about here.]
IV.2 What is the Size Factor?
PC2 is the normal-risk-adjusted return on a portfolio that is long small banks and short large
banks. The weights of the portfolio are given by the second principal component. Figure 2 plots
the 12-month moving average (months t − 11 through t) of PC2 series along with a plot of the
index for industrial production. The units are monthly returns. The gray-shaded regions represent
NBER recessions and the light-shaded regions represent banking crisis. The NBER recession
dates are published by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee. The dates for the Mexico
and LTCM crisis were obtained from Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000) and the FDIC (for the Less-
Developed-Country debt crisis of 1982).
The size factor, which by construction is orthogonal to the bond and equity pricing factors,
declines during recessions and ﬁnancial crises. Moreover, it is very sensitive to large slowdowns in
the growth rate of industrial production. We plot a backward looking 12-month moving average,
which explains why the returns appear to drop a couple of months after the start of the NBER
recessions. The returns also tends to increase before the end of the NBER recession.7 On average,
during recessions, this normal-risk-adjusted return drops by an average of 3.30% per month or
39.57% per annum. During the most recent recession, which coincides with ﬁnancial crisis, the size
factor lost 89% of its value, after adjusting for risk exposure.
[Figure 2 about here.]
We also extended our sample to the pre-war era by including all banks and sorting these by
market capitalization. We used the same principal component weights on this sample; see Figure 4
in the appendix. We observe the same pattern in the size factor in risk-adjusted returns. In every
7There are two exceptions to this cyclical pattern. One is the double-dip recession in the early eighties. Small
banks stocks were already recovering from the huge declines suﬀered relative to large bank stocks, and hence starting
from very low valuations, when the second recession started. The second is the 2001 recessions in the wake of the
Long Term Capital Management crisis. Moreover, in 2001, the NBER chose the starting point of the recessions well
after the decline in industrial production started (in other recessions, the starting date coincides with the decline
in industrial production.)
20NBER recession that we examined, the size factor decreases substantially; the largest losses in this
sample are incurred towards the end of the Great Depression.
Panel A in Table VIII shows the value at the trough of the NBER cycle (the end of the banking
crisis) of a $100 invested at the peak of the NBER cycle (the start of the banking crisis) in the
slope portfolio – the weights are given by the normalized second principal component. The second
column reports the dollar value after subtracting the performance of a benchmark portfolio with
the same exposure to the bond and equity factors ($100+x means the a cumulative return of x%
in excess of the benchmark portfolio). This is the return on a portfolio that is hedged to have
zero betas with respect to the standard risk factors. The third column reports the dollar value
without risk-adjustment. On average, the unhedged size portfolio loses $35 during a recession or
banking crisis. The fourth column column reports the returns on the same investment strategy
after hedging out the exposure to the standard equity and bond factors. That hedged strategy loses
more than $60 per recession. As is clear from panel B, the largest losses are concentrated in the
ﬁrst six months of the NBER recessions, just under $30 in normal-risk-adjusted terms. Moreover,
this portfolio (both hedged and unhedged) experienced steep declines during the Less Developed
Country and the LTCM crises.
Panel B in Table VIII shows the average value of the portfolio n months into a recession. The
hedged portfolio gradually drops more in value. Twelve months after the peak it has lost almost
$63 dollars of its value.
[Table 8 about here.]
The size factor appears to be a reliable measure of bank-speciﬁc tail risk. During the most
recent U.S. recession, a full-ﬂedged banking crisis, the hedged size portfolio of commercial banks
lost close to 90 cents on the dollar (see Table VIII). This is not a surprise. In 2008, 18% of
the commercial banks in the ﬁrst market capitalization decile were delisted, followed by another
30% in 2009. We also went back to 1926 by including all banks in our sample. During the Great
Depression (NBER recession dates), the hedged size portfolio of all ﬁnancials was trading at -44
cents at the end of the recession per $100 invested at the peak.
21In the data, there is a strong connection between the business cycle and the incidence of banking
panics. We examined the U.S. banking panics starting in 1873, as well as the NBER business cycle
peaks and troughs. Except for the ﬁrst banking panic, all of these occur during the contraction
phase of the U.S. business cycle. The dates of the banking panics were taken from Gorton (1988,
p. 223) and Wicker (1996, p. 155). The details are provided in Table XIV in the separate
appendix. This is not the case for non-ﬁnancials. Giesecke, Longstaﬀ, Schaefer, and Strebulaev
(2010) examine 150 years of U.S. corporate history and they ﬁnd a weak relation between the
business cycle and corporate bond defaults.
IV.3 Alternative Explanations
Large idiosyncratic shocks can cause bank failures. If the volatility of these shocks increases more
in recessions for small banks, that could explain some of our ﬁndings. Smaller banks are much
more exposed to idiosyncratic risk than large banks, but the amount of idiosyncratic risk exposure
of small banks does not seem to increase very much during recessions. During NBER recessions,
the standard deviation ranges from 38% for the smallest banks to 26% for the largest banks as
compared to 36% and 20% respectively in the whole sample. The details are in the separate
appendix (section B). Hence, the largest percentage point increase in volatility during recessions
is noted for the largest banks: from 20% to 26%. For the smallest banks, the increase is less than
two percentage points. There is no evidence to suggest that the cyclicality of the size factor is due
to idiosyncratic banks risk. While smaller banks are more exposed to idiosyncratic risk, we do not
see large increases in this type of risk during recessions.
There is no evidence that business cycle variation in cash ﬂows can explain our ﬁndings. If
anything, the evidence suggests that large ﬁnancial institutions are more exposes to business cycle
risk. Boyd and Gertler (1993) analyze the impact of size on the performance of banks as measured
by accounting data. They show that increased competition and ﬁnancial innovation have induced
the largest banks to participate in riskier investments.8 We examined bank performance during
8This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2007); they document a reverse bank-
run phenomenon for large deposit-taking institutions in periods of tight aggregate liquidity. In related work, Gatev
22the last two recessions by studying the Quarterly Banking Reports issued by the FDIC, and we
found that small banks tend to outperform large banks during recessions. Section B of the separate
appendix contains the details.
V The Pricing of Bank Tail Risk and the Government
The average return of this size factor is the price of banking tail risk insurance, and it can be
measured for individual banks as the loading on this factor times this risk price. When the price
of tail risk measured by the size factor is negative, we will refer to this as a tail risk subsidy. If
not, it is a tail risk tax. This section examines how bank-speciﬁc tail risk is priced in the stock
market, and relates it to the regulatory regime and to government announcements.
V.1 Size of Largest Banks
The events immediately after the collapse of Lehman in September 2008 conﬁrm the commonly-
held view that the U.S. government and monetary authorities are reluctant to let large ﬁnancial
institutions fail collectively, even though they may be occasionally willing to let individual insti-
tutions fail. For example, over the course the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the Federal Reserve made
emergency loans totaling about $9.99 trillion to 10 of the largest U.S. ﬁnancial institutions, which
accounted for 83% of the emergency credit extended to all U.S. institutions.9 Moreover, even if
regulators are willing to let these large banks fail, the uncertainty about the resolution regime for
distressed banks clearly favors the creditors and shareholders of large ﬁnancial institutions.
Consistent with this view, even in the highest market capitalization decile of commercial banks,
we ﬁnd a strong negative relation between the market capitalization of individual ﬁrms relative to
GDP and the loading on the size factor. We chose banks that were in portfolio 10 in each year
of our sample and then computed the loadings on PC2 over the subsequent ﬁve-year window. As
and Strahan (2006) ﬁnd that large banks provide aggregate liquidity insurance to non-ﬁnancial corporations.
9Data from the Term Auction Facility (TAF) (provided emergency loans to commercial banks), the Primary
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)(provided emergency loans to investment banks and other broker-dealers, which
typically do not have access to Fed funds) and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)(which allowed ﬁnancial
ﬁrms to borrow Treasury securities).
23individual banks grow larger over time relative to GDP, their loadings on this size factor clearly tend
to increase. The slope coeﬃcient in the regression of PC2 loadings on market capitalization/GDP
is 0.018, meaning that a 100% increase in the size of market capitalization relative to GDP raises
the loading by 0.018 in absolute value or, equivalently, it increases the tail risk subsidy by 68 bps
per annum.
V.2 Regulatory Regime
We want to relate the pricing of tail risk, as captured by the size factor, to the regulatory regime of
diﬀerent banks. Commercial banks and GSEs beneﬁt from special provisions: deposit insurance10,
access to the discount window at the Federal reserve and other special lending facilities in the case
of commercial banks, and widely acknowledged debt guarantees in the case of GSEs. Foreign banks
and investment banks do not enjoy the same level of protection.
Table IX compares the results for a value-weighted index of commercial banks, investment
banks, foreign banks, and GSEs. The ﬁrst row reports the value-weighted average market capi-
talization for each index. For foreign banks, this only includes the market capitalization of U.S.
listed shares.11 Investment and foreign banks do not beneﬁt from the tail risk subsidy to commer-
cial banks, but the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) clearly do. Over the entire sample, the
subsidy to commercial banks is 2.32% and the subsidy to GSEs is 1.95%. The loadings on R[PC2]
are much smaller (investment banks) or positive (foreign banks) and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table IX shows the same results for the largest commercial, investment banks and GSEs. Panel
A shows the results for the entire sample excluding the crisis. The tail risk subsidy is largest for
the large commercial banks. For BoA (1973-2009), we estimate a tail risk subsidy of 3.12% per
annum, for Wells Fargo (1970-2009) it is 3.27%, and for Citibank (1986-2009) it is 1.94 %. For
investment banks, these eﬀects are much smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant. Lehman is the
only exception.
10The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 limits the protection of creditors, but it provides a systemic risk exception.
11The worldwide market-cap for just the 6 largest banks included in the index of foreign banks is $330.21 billion
in 2010
24As a benchmark, we also computed the loading on R[PC2] for an index of hedge fund returns.
Hedge funds do not beneﬁt from the umbrella extended to large banks. We used the HFRI fund-
weighted hedge fund index. These results are not reported. Over the entire sample (from 1991 -
2005) the loading for hedge fund returns on R[PC2] is 0.02 (t-stat 2.66) and this reduces to 0.01
(t-stat 0.91) over 2000 - 2005. Hence, as expected, hedge funds face a tail risk tax, because the
loadings are positive, just like small banks.
These results lend some support to a government-based interpretation of the size factor, as com-
mercial banks and GSEs beneﬁt from more extensive government guarantees than other ﬁnancial
institutions.12
V.3 Elimination of Glass-Steagall
The Glass-Steagall Act (1933) eﬀectively separated U.S. commercial banking from investment
banking. The provisions of this act preventing bank holding companies from owning ﬁnancial
companies were repealed in 1999. Its repeal allowed large commercial banks to originate and trade
collateralized debt obligations.
After 2000, the tail risk subsidy to commercial banks more than doubled to 4.76%, and the
subsidy to GSEs more than tripled to 6%. These numbers were determined by multiplying the
loadings with the same risk price (38.93%) computed over the entire sample. There was also a
marked increase in the exposure of investment and foreign banks to the size factor.
[Table 9 about here.]
The loadings for the largest commercial banks increased dramatically in the last decade. The
BoA tail risk subsidy increased from 3.17% to 4.53% in 2000-2005, while the Citi subsidy increased
from 2.18% to 4.59%. This is exactly what one would have expected to see given the enormous
increase in total asset size realized by these banks. Wells Fargo collected a subsidy of 6.15% in
2000-2005, compared to 4.40% in the 1990-2005 sample. The largest subsidy is collected by Fannie
Mae (6.57%), in spite of its smaller size. Lehman also collect a large subsidy in this period. Both
12The GSEs and foreign banks were suggested to us by Martin Bodenstein.
25Lehman and Fannie Mae were building up substantial exposure to the subprime mortgage market
during this period. Note that there is no mechanical connection between our size factor and the
subprime exposure, since we exclude the ﬁnancial crisis from the sample. Exposure to the size
factor seems a good yardstick of systemic risk exposure.
V.4 Announcement Eﬀects
In September 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency announced a list of 10 banks that were deemed
too big to fail. We examine the pricing of the ﬁnancial tail risk embedded in the stocks of these
10 banks around this announcement date. Table X lists all the announcement dates.
Pre-crisis Announcement Dates We also look at six other announcement dates listed by Kho,
Lee, and Stulz (2000). Table XI reports the results. We report regressions for windows of 30, 45,
60, 90, and 105 days around the announcement date. Panel A lists results from a pooled regression
for all seven announcement dates. In the 30-day window after the Comptroller announcements,
the loading increases by 0.12. This amounts to an annualized 4.56 % tail risk subsidy. This eﬀect
gradually decreases as we increase the window around the event. We ﬁnd slightly smaller eﬀects
for the LTCM, Brazilian, Mexican and South-Korean crisis. The average eﬀect is a 1.14 pps (0.03
times 38%) increase in the tail risk subsidy. This average eﬀect is roughly constant across the
windows. These eﬀects are economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
Crisis Announcement Dates In the crisis sample, we identiﬁed announcements that increased
the likelihood of a bailout for all banks, for large banks and, ﬁnally, we also looked at events that
decreased the likelihood of a bailout. These are listed in Panel B of Table X.
[Table 10 about here.]
[Table 11 about here.]
Panel B looks at the ﬁnancial crisis announcements. Only the positive announcements for large
banks have an economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the pricing of tail risk. The tail
26risk subsidy for the too-big-to-fail banks increases by 2.66 pps in a 30-day window around these
announcements. The other announcements have small or negative eﬀects that are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
VI Recovery Rates and Equilibrium Pricing of Tail Risk
in the Banking Sector
To help us interpret our empirical ﬁndings, we use a stylized dynamic asset pricing model with
time-varying probability of banking panics that reproduces the size anomalies, as well as the size
factor in returns. The driving force is the size variation in recovery rates.
VI.1 A Simple Model of the Size Anomaly in Bank Stock Returns
The model yields a key testable prediction: a size factor in normal-risk-adjusted returns on banking
portfolios that is tied to the U.S. business cycle.
We adopt a version of the models with time-varying probabilities of ﬁnancial disasters proposed
by Gabaix (2008) and Wachter (2008). These are extensions of the rare event models developed by
Barro (2006) and Rietz (1988). In our model, the stochastic discount factor has two components:
a standard normal component and a disaster component:
Mt+1 = M
G





t+1 in states with a ﬁnancial disaster.
MG
t+1 denotes the representative investor’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) in
normal times, i.e., in states without a disaster. In the simplest version of his model, Gabaix
(2008) deﬁnes ∆logCt+1 = gC + σηt+1 as the growth rate of consumption in normal times, and
∆logCt+1 = gC + σηt+1 + logF c
t as the consumption growth rate in the ﬁnancial disaster state,
where 1 ≥ F c
t > 0. ηt+1 is Gaussian white noise. pt denotes the probability of a ﬁnancial disaster.
27In the absence of a ﬁnancial disaster, the IMRS is completely determined by normal risk. We








t to denote the vector of conditional normal risk factor betas for the returns on asset i,
and we use λt to denote the vector of normal risk prices. We make some additional simplifying
assumptions in order to characterize disaster risk premia analytically. First, we assume that the
conditional distribution of the normal risk factors ft is independent of the disaster realization.
Second, we assume that pt does not co-vary with the normal risk factors ft. This second assumption
implies that the recession risk itself is not priced, only the ﬁnancial disaster risk itself is.












t in states with banking crisis
∆logD
i,G
t+1 is the Gaussian component of dividend growth. 1 ≥ F i
t > 0 can be thought of as
the recovery rate; in case the rare event is realized, a fraction F i of the dividend gets wiped out
(See Longstaﬀ and Piazzesi (2004) and Barro (2006)). This recovery rate will vary across banks
depending on size, partly because the realization of this rare event can trigger a collective bailout
of larger banks, but not necessarily of smaller banks. There is strong empirical evidence for size-
dependent variation in disaster recovery rates. In our sample (1970-2009), the average delisting
rate for banks in the ﬁrst market capitalization decile is 1.77%, compared to 0.018% for the ninth
decile and 0% for the tenth decile. During 2008, 18% of banks in the ﬁrst decile were delisted,
another 30% were delisted in 2009, and, ﬁnally, 10% in 2010. None of the commercial banks in
the highest decile were delisted. Including acquisitions increases these numbers to 19% and 32%
respectively.
The resilience of banks is deﬁned as the marginal-utility-weighted recovery rate in disaster
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. As the economy enters into a recession, pt increases and the resilience
of large banks HB
t increases relative to small banks HS
t if F B
t+1 > F S
t+1. In fact, we assume that the
recovery rate F n
t > F
n−1
t increases monotonically in size.
The expected return on asset i, conditional on no disaster realization, after adjusting for normal
risk exposure, becomes Et[  Ri
t+1] = exp(r − hi
t), where Et[  Ri
t+1] = Et[Ri
t+1] − βi
tλt, and r denotes
logRt = logEt[MG
t+1]−1, and hi
t denotes log(1 + Hi
t). The proof is in the Appendix .
To derive a simple expression for average normal-risk-adjusted returns, we abstract from vari-
ation in normal betas and risk prices. In the interest of tractability, we assume that the recovery
rates F i are constant over time, and we also assume that the size of the consumption disaster F C
is constant over time. The conditional beta βt and the conditional risk prices λt are constant. In











= E[log(1 + Hi)]. The diﬀerence in alphas in a sample without a rare event realization





. Hence, we can interpret the 6% diﬀerence between small and large bank portfolios
in the normal-risk-adjusted returns as measuring diﬀerences in the resilience of these bank portfolios
to banking crises.
A key prediction of this model is that this variation in the probability of a ﬁnancial disaster in
turn imputes common variation to the normal-risk-adjusted stock returns along the size dimension,
since we assumed that the recovery rate depends on size, even in a sample without disasters. The
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. This is a size factor because the loadings depend on the recovery rates and hence
(by assumption) on size. The conditional normal-risk-adjusted multiplicative risk premium on a













As pt increases during recessions, the risk premium on this long-short portfolio becomes more
29negative. This variation in risk premia is the driving force. The size factor tracks the variation in
pt.
The characteristic (the size of the bank) actually determines the ﬁnancial disaster risk premium,
because of the collective bailout guarantee for large banks. This creates an opening for arbitrage
opportunities. Let us assume that there is a single critical size threshold. In this case, the low
recovery rate (F i = F) applies for all bank portfolios with size below the cutoﬀ. Also, suppose
banks do not switch between portfolios as a result of growth, mergers or acquisitions. For banks in
portfolios above the cutoﬀ, the higher recovery rate applies: F i = F. The baseline model predicts
large positive, but constant, α’s for all the banks in size-sorted portfolios below the threshold, and
much smaller, negative α’s for all banks above the threshold. In that sense, the pattern we found
in the data is surprising. However, this stark (α,α) outcome can only be an equilibrium if there
are prohibitively large costs associated with merging and acquiring banks.
Suppose there are no such costs. Consider two banks (A and B) just below the threshold with
recovery rates F A = F B = F. By bundling the cash ﬂows of these two banks (A and B), the
recovery rate increases to F A+B = F, and the value of a claim to the cash ﬂows of A and B will
exceed the sum of the value of these cash ﬂows: P(A)+P(B) ≤ P(A+B). In the absence of costs,
this represents an arbitrage. However, if there are positive costs C, then the value of A and B has
to increase such that P(A)+P(B) ≥ P(A+B)−C[A,B] to eliminate the arbitrage opportunities.
This increase reﬂects the probability that these banks end up crossing the size threshold because
of growth or because of a future merger or acquisition. Hence, the α’s for these banks (A and B)
will decrease, as their value rises, even though they do not directly beneﬁt from the guarantee yet.
Alternatively, A and B will actually merge right away.
There was a large amount of concentration in the banking sector in the last decades. Table
I reports an increase from 50% (in the 1970’s) to 90 % (in the last decade) in the share of total
market capitalization accounted for by the top decile. The increase in the share of total balance
sheet accounted for by the top decile is from 52% to 95%. Kane (2000) and Brewer and Jagtiani
(2007) document acquiring banks are willing to pay larger premiums for banks that put them
30over critical size thresholds, consistent with our hypothesis. By backward induction, the same
argument applies to smaller banks in other portfolios. However, the costs of bundling the cash
ﬂows (C[D,E,F,...,Z]) of many smaller banks to reach this critical threshold increase, and this
mitigates the eﬀect on the average risk-adjusted returns. This can account for the decreasing
pattern in the alphas that we have found in the data.
VI.2 Calibrated GE Asset Pricing Model
Obviously, the independence of risk factors and pt that we need to derive simple, analytical charac-
terizations of the risk-adjusted returns is very restrictive. This section develops a general equilib-
rium version of this model, in which these restrictions are relaxed. We show there is a qualitatively
similar relation between the average risk-adjusted returns and the ﬁnancial disaster recovery rates
provided that the market itself is not as exposed to ﬁnancial disaster risk as banks.
We use a modiﬁed version of Gourio (2008)’s model. The stand-in agents has Epstein-Zin utility















. This agent cares about the
intertemporal composition of risk. α−1 controls the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, while














where Rw denotes the return on a claim to aggregate consumption.
The process for aggregate consumption growth is given by:
∆logCt+1 = gC + σηt+1,in states without ﬁnancial disaster
∆logCt+1 = gC + σηt+1 + logF
c,in states with ﬁnancial disaster.
31When p is i.i.d., this model can be solved analytically. We are interested in the case in which p
varies over the business cycle. We solve a version of this model with two aggregate states.
We choose σ, the standard deviation of Gaussian aggregate consumption growth shocks, equal
to 3%, and gC equal to 2%. The time discount factor β is set to 0.975. Following Gourio (2008),
we use a two-state discretization for the aggregate state of the economy. In the recession state,
the probability of a ﬁnancial disaster is high. In the expansion state, the probability of a ﬁnancial
disaster is low. The average length of an expansion is 44 months. The average length of a recession
is 16 months. The ratio of the average length of an expansion to the average length of a recession
is 2.62. We set the average probability of a banking crisis to 13%, because the U.S. spent 13% of
all years since 1800 in a banking panic according to Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009).13 The aggregate
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(1−ϕ)+(1−φ)}. To match the average length of a recession
(16 months), we set ϕ equal to 0.25. The same transition matrix Q applies in disaster and non-
disaster states. To match the ratio, we choose φ equal to 0.71. In an expansion, the conditional
probability of a banking panic pex = 0. In a recession, the conditional probability of a banking
panic pre = 0.466. Finally, we consider a cumulative consumption drop of 5% (F C = 0.95) in the
ﬁnancial disaster state. This scenario matches the experience of all developed economies considered













c,in states with ﬁnancial disaster.
13This matches 13 U.S. ﬁnancial crises over 210 years with an average length of 2.1 years.












i,in states with ﬁnancial disaster.
We assume that small and large banks have the same cash ﬂow properties in normal times. However,
small banks will have recovery rates below the F S < F c, and large banks will have recovery rates
in excess of F L > F c.14
First, we consider the benchmark case in which the market is exposed to levered normal and
disaster risk. Panel A in Table XII reports the results for diﬀerent values of the recovery rates.
These results were generated by generating 25,000 draws from the model. The ﬁrst column reports
the equity premium conditional on no disaster in the sample (E[Rm,e|no disaster]). The second
column reports the actual equity premium (E[Ri,e]). The third and fourth column report the
conditional equity premium in expansions and recessions. Finally, the last two columns report the
average normal-risk-adjusted returns and the market beta.
We replicate the treatment of the actual data on model-generated data. To compute the
alpha, we assume that the Gaussian component of the SDF is linear in the market excess return
(MG = a+bRm,e), and hence we project the excess returns on the bank stocks on the excess return
on the market in a sample without disasters. In a sample with disasters, the alphas are very close
to zero, even though the CAPM does not hold exactly (see equation 7: The log SDF depends on
the (unlevered) total wealth return and consumption growth).
The left panel of Table XII considers the benchmark case of a 5% drop in aggregate consumption.
The leverage of the market is 2.5. The banks have leverage of 2. With a 10% diﬀerence in the
unlevered ﬁnancial disaster recovery rate, the diﬀerence in the equity premium between small
(7.11%) and large banks (2.29%) is 482 bps. However, most of this diﬀerence is accounted for by
14One might conjecture that small banks simply under-perform during recessions. Although this should not lead
to diﬀerences in α, but rather diﬀerences in exposure to the standard risk factors, we want to check this, because it
might be important for how cash ﬂows are modeled. Actually, we ﬁnd small bank cash ﬂows to be less exposed to
aggregate risk. The evidence is reported in section B of the appendix.
33the higher beta, not by α diﬀerences.
As a result, the unlevered diﬀerence in the recovery rates needs to exceed 35% to match the
spread in normal risk-adjusted returns we have observed in the data. Given that 32% of banks in
the ﬁrst decile were delisted in 2010 alone, that seems reasonable. When the diﬀerence in recovery
rates is 35 cents, the diﬀerences in α is 551 bps. However, because the market itself is exposed
to ﬁnancial disaster risk, small banks have much higher loadings (2.10) on the market than large
banks (0.59). This is at odds with the data.
The right panel Table XII considers the case of a 2.5% drop in aggregate consumption. In
this case, a smaller diﬀerences in recovery rates of 30% is suﬃcient to match the diﬀerence in
normal-risk-adjusted returns.
[Table 12 about here.]
The model can match the large betas of large banks and small betas of small banks, while still
matching the average normal risk-adjusted-returns provided that the stock market is less exposed
to ﬁnancial disaster risk: The market (equity) is a levered claim to aggregate consumption Cλ, but
the leverage only applies to the normal risk, not the disaster risk:
∆logD
m
t+1 = gC + λ
mσηt+1,in states without ﬁnancial disaster
∆logD
m
t+1 = gC + λ
mσηt+1 + logF
c,in states with ﬁnancial disaster.
The dividend growth process for bank stocks is unchanged. In this calibration, we increased σ to
3.50 % and we increased θ to match the same ex-disaster equity premium of 5.80%. The results
are shown in Panel II of Table XII. The top right panel considers the benchmark case of a 5%
drop in aggregate consumption. The leverage of the market is 2.5, but leverage only applies to the
Gaussian component. This seems reasonable. Between June 2007 and March 2009, the market lost
about 50% of its value, while the ﬁnancial sector lost more than 80% of its value during the same
period.
The key diﬀerence is that the equity premium contains a much smaller ﬁnancial disaster risk
34premium. As a result, a larger fraction of the diﬀerence in risk premia ends up in the alpha.
Consider the case of a 5% aggregate consumption drop. When bank leverage is equal to 2, and
with a 20% diﬀerence in the unlevered ﬁnancial disaster recovery rate, the diﬀerence in alphas
exceeds 600 bps, while the betas for the large banks are larger than the betas for small banks. In
fact, when we choose large bank leverage equal to 3, and small bank leverage equal to 1, there is
a 57 bps spread in the betas, and a 642 basis point spread in the alphas. The required diﬀerence
in the recovery rates is 35 cents on the dollar.
Figure 3 plots the simulated returns on a small-minus-big bank portfolio (dotted line) for this
calibration. A period denotes one year. The dotted line plots the stock market return. The stock
market return is driven by normal risk, while the small-minus-big portfolio responds mostly to the
probability of a ﬁnancial disaster, which increases in recessions. The shaded areas are recession
states. The small-minus-big portfolio is a recession factor, as in the data. Moreover, this portfolio
has negative market beta.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Finally, if we consider a 2.5% aggregate consumption drop, and we set the leverage of small
banks equal to one, we can actually match the spread in betas of more than 100 bps between
portfolio 1-10 observed in the data. However, the spread in alphas is only 500 bps.
VII Conclusion
We document a size anomaly in bank stock returns that is diﬀerent from the size eﬀect that has
been documented for non-ﬁnancials. This size eﬀect can be explained by the covariance with a
new size factor that we extract from that component of bank stock returns that is orthogonal
to standard risk factors. This size factor is a measure of bank-speciﬁc tail risk. Our evidence
from bank stock returns reveals how the pricing of bank-speciﬁc tail risk in ﬁnancial markets may
depend on which bank is holding the risk. To the extent that these eﬀects reﬂect implicit bailout
35guarantees in ﬁnancial disasters, the government subsidizes large ﬁnancial institutions to take on
bank-speciﬁc tail risk.
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39Table I: Market capitalization and book value for size-sorted portfolios
Notes: This table presents the total market capitalization (book value) of ﬁrms in each size-sorted portfolio as
a percentage of total market capitalization (book value) for the entire banking sector. The market values (book
values) are measured in January of each year. Mean represents the average value of this percentage over the years
speciﬁed. N is the average number of banks in each portfolio over the same period.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Panel A: Market Capitalization
1970-1980
Mean 0.36 0.92 1.50 1.95 3.50 4.67 7.61 11.51 18.21 49.78
N 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
1980-1990
Mean 0.33 0.72 1.10 1.66 2.39 3.61 5.71 8.84 17.28 58.34
N 26.00 27.00 26.00 27.00 27.00 26.00 27.00 26.00 26.00 27.00
1990-2000
Mean 0.17 0.34 0.52 0.76 1.10 1.56 2.32 3.99 8.52 80.71
N 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00
2000-2009
Mean 0.13 0.24 0.35 0.50 0.68 0.95 1.42 2.33 4.62 88.78
N 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 63.00
Panel B: Book Value
1980-1990
Mean 0.34 1.04 1.83 2.44 3.39 4.33 6.06 9.90 18.72 51.94
N 10.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00
Leverage 13.55 15.86 16.04 16.42 16.59 17.22 17.67 17.73 18.54 22.37
1990-2000
Mean 0.13 0.31 0.50 0.73 1.02 1.46 2.41 4.14 10.75 78.56
N 45.00 46.00 45.00 46.00 45.00 45.00 46.00 45.00 45.00 46.00
Leverage 11.42 11.16 12.17 11.82 14.03 13.56 13.73 14.40 13.83 15.86
2000-2009
Mean 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.27 0.36 0.51 0.79 1.35 3.33 92.96
N 61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 62.00 61.00 62.00
Leverage 8.38 10.82 5.86 14.36 11.64 11.97 12.35 12.27 10.77 14.01
40Table II: Mean returns for size-sorted portfolios of commercial banks
Notes: This table presents the mean returns for each size-sorted portfolio of banks sorted by market capitalization
in the top panel and by total balance sheet in the bottom panel. The ﬁrst column indicates the years over which
mean returns were computed. The monthly mean returns have been annualized by multiplying by 12 and are
expressed in percentages.
Panel A: Market Cap
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1970− 2005 17.47 16.73 16.15 15.96 16.05 17.03 15.89 14.37 13.77 13.26
1980− 2005 19.81 19.18 18.09 17.84 18.31 19.94 19.38 17.15 16.31 16.17
1990− 2005 19.61 20.90 18.24 17.67 20.32 19.15 18.69 17.34 16.62 16.90
Panel B: Book Value
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1980− 2005 16.36 17.57 19.46 18.84 20.68 21.75 20.12 16.89 13.95 13.68
1990− 2005 13.65 18.03 19.44 18.76 20.54 20.00 21.34 17.96 13.67 11.00
41Table III: Mean returns for size-sorted portfolios of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
Notes: This table presents the mean returns for each size-sorted portfolio of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms sorted by market
capitalization in the top panel and by total balance sheet in the bottom panel. Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are deﬁned
as those for which the SIC code lies outside 6000 - 6799. The ﬁrst column indicates the years over which mean
returns were computed. The monthly mean returns have been annualized by multiplying by 12 and are expressed
in percentages. The ﬁrst column indicates the years over which mean returns were computed. The monthly mean
returns have been annualized by multiplying by 12 and are expressed in percentages.
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Panel A: Market Cap
1970− 2005 24.51 15.76 13.38 12.41 11.61 12.12 12.21 12.55 13.30 11.39
1980− 2005 26.29 15.47 13.25 12.02 11.27 11.51 12.07 12.57 14.32 13.18
1990− 2005 30.13 17.75 14.96 14.11 12.43 12.04 11.47 10.65 12.56 10.61
Panel B: Book Values
1970− 2005 16.05 16.75 15.90 15.15 14.90 15.39 15.63 15.26 15.02 13.29
1980− 2005 16.08 17.14 16.59 15.65 15.19 15.81 16.52 15.92 15.94 14.74
1990− 2005 21.06 19.68 18.32 17.62 16.28 16.43 16.24 15.80 14.75 12.56
42Table IV: Mean Risk-adjusted returns in size-sorted portfolios of commercial banks
Notes: This table presents the estimates from an OLS regression of monthly excess returns on each size-sorted portfolio of banks on the Fama-French
stock and bond risk factors. market, smb, and hml are the three Fama-French stock factors: the market, small minus big, and high minus low
respectively. ltg is the excess return on an index of long-term government bonds and crd is the excess return on an index of investment-grade corporate
bonds. Statistical signiﬁcance is indicated by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The alphas have been annualized by multiplying
by 12 and are expressed in percentages. The standard errors were adjusted for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation using Newey-West with 3 lags.
The sample is 1970-2005.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 8 - 3 9 - 2 10 - 1
Panel A: Market Cap
α 5.45∗∗ 4.11∗ 3.25 2.05 1.75 2.11 0.64 -0.70 -2.51 -2.53 -3.95∗∗ -6.62∗∗∗ -7.97∗∗∗
market 0.36∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
smb 0.39∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.42∗∗∗
hml 0.32∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.09
ltg -0.16 -0.11 -0.05 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.26∗∗ 0.15 0.17 0.37∗∗∗ 0.30∗
crd 0.51∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.21 0.17 0.29∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.18 0.11 0.13 -0.17 -0.30∗ -0.38∗
R2 29.12 40.47 42.80 53.16 53.56 55.36 61.49 62.99 65.09 63.62 6.21 18.83 27.91
Panel B: Book Value
α 3.29 3.98 4.91∗ 4.54∗∗ 3.80 4.53∗ 2.12 -1.39 -3.17 -2.56 -6.30∗∗ -7.15∗∗∗ -5.85∗
market 0.49∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
smb 0.50∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.05 0.13 -0.19∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
hml 0.44∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.12 -0.02
ltg 0.17 0.19 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.21∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.19 0.18 0.20 -0.00 0.00
crd 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.43∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.16 0.16 0.07 -0.09 0.03 0.01
R2 38.53 44.04 46.66 52.12 53.17 60.49 63.50 54.84 62.13 46.24 8.04 15.03 14.46
4
3Table V: Mean risk-adjusted returns in size-sorted portfolios of non-ﬁnancials
Notes: This table presents the estimates from an OLS regression of monthly excess returns on each size-sorted portfolio of non-ﬁnancials on the
Fama-French stock and bond risk factors. market, smb, and hml are the three Fama-French stock factors: the market, small minus big, and high minus
low respectively. ltg is the excess return on an index of long-term government bonds and crd is the excess return on an index of investment-grade
corporate bonds. Statistical signiﬁcance is indicated by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The alphas have been annualized by
multiplying by 12 and are expressed in percentages. The standard errors were adjusted for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation using Newey-West
with 3 lags. The sample is 1970-2005.
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 8 - 3 9 - 2 10 - 1
Panel A: Market Cap
α 11.17∗∗∗ 1.55 -1.22 -2.10 -3.03∗∗ -2.36∗∗ -2.02∗∗ -1.06 0.20 0.61 0.16 -1.35 -10.56 ∗∗∗
market 0.77∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗
smb 0.82∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗
hml 0.34∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.18 0.11 0.09 -0.10∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗
ltg -0.47∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗ -0.20∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.14∗ -0.07 -0.10∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
crd 0.36∗ 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.13∗∗∗ -0.15 -0.20 -0.23
R2 52.70 67.11 74.48 76.89 82.69 86.57 89.16 89.62 91.22 97.03 17.42 22.76 34.76
Panel B: Book Value
α 3.02 2.91 2.16 1.13 0.62 1.00 0.73 0.80 0.55 -0.07 -1.36 -2.36 -3.09
market 0.99∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.10 0.12 -0.01
smb 0.92∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.35∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗
hml 0.14 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.22∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.13 0.08 0.13
ltg -0.42∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.03 -0.07∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗
crd 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.04 -0.11 -0.09 0.07 -0.27∗ -0.29 -0.15
R2 55.54 67.97 75.48 83.02 86.01 88.98 91.62 92.07 93.97 93.32 14.89 16.70 27.23
4
4Table VI: Principal components of size-sorted commercial bank stock returns
Notes: This table presents the loadings for the ﬁrst and second principal components (w1,w2) extracted from
the residuals of the regression speciﬁed in equation 2. The last row indicates the % explained by each principal
component.
Market Cap Book Value
1970 - 2009 1980 - 2009
Portfolio w1 w2 w1 w2
1 0.31 0.42 0.21 0.34
2 0.29 0.35 0.25 0.30
3 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.26
4 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.19
5 0.33 0.16 0.38 0.20
6 0.34 0.00 0.37 -0.01
7 0.35 -0.21 0.36 -0.11
8 0.32 -0.26 0.40 -0.19
9 0.32 -0.37 0.30 -0.24
10 0.33 -0.51 0.23 -0.74
% 47.63 18.37 47.56 15.39
45Table VII: Size-factor-adjusted returns for size-sorted portfolios of commercial banks
Notes: This table presents the estimates from OLS regression of monthly excess returns on each size-sorted
portfolio of commercial banks on the Fama-French stock factors, bond factors, and the second principal component
weighted returns. mkt, smb, and hml are the three Fama-French factors: the market, small minus big, and high
minus low respectively. ltg is the excess return on an index of long-term government bonds and crd is the excess
return on an index of investment-grade corporate bonds. RPC2 is the time-series of the returns of the size-sorted
portfolios weighed by the loadings of the second principal component   w2. The weights of the second principal
component have been re-normalized so that they sum to 1. Statistical signiﬁcance is indicated by *, **, and *** at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The alphas have been annualized by multiplying by 12 and are expressed
in percentages. The standard errors were adjusted for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation using Newey-West
with 3 lags. The last two lines show the loadings on the size factor and the implicit tax (risk price times loading on
PC2). The annualized risk price is 38.93% in the sample ending in 2005.
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Risk-adjusted Returns
1970 - 2005 0.78 0.60 0.26 -0.41 0.56 2.28 1.77 0.87 0.27 1.66
Loading on 2nd PC
1970 - 2005 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.00 -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
Size Factor Adjustment
1970− 2005 3.25 2.44 2.08 1.71 0.83 -0.12 -0.79 -1.10 -1.94 -2.92
46Table VIII: Cumulative return on 2nd pc portfolio in recessions and ﬁnancial crises
Notes: This table shows the value of a $100 invested in a portfolio that goes long in small banks and shorts large
banks. The weights of the portfolio are given by the second principal component, re-normalized so that they sum
to 1 (  w2). $100 is invested in this portfolio at the ’Start’ date and its value, given in columns 3 and 4, is measured
on the ’End’ date. The column labeled Value represents the value of $100 invested at the peak (or start of the
crisis) at the trough (or end of the crisis) on this portfolio and the column labeled Hedged Value represents the
normal-risk-adjusted returns on this portfolio. The average is computed for all NBER recessions only using the
NBER dating conventions. The bottom panel shows the value of a $100 investment n months into the recession.
The ﬁrst two columns use all portfolios. The last two columns exclude the ﬁrst portfolio containing the smallest
banks.
Panel A: Portfolio Value at NBER Trough
Start End Value Hedged Value
NBER Recessions
01: 1970 11: 1970 -12.23 32.74
11: 1973 03: 1975 -17.10 26.50
01: 1980 11: 1982 47.34 8.51
07: 1990 03: 1991 19.54 17.05
03: 2001 11: 2001 287.33 138.48
12: 2007 06: 2009 63.53 11.77
Average 64.73 39.17
Panel B: Average Portfolio Value n months after NBER Peak
Value Hedged Value
Month 1 128.26 112.52
Month 2 88.76 86.04
Month 3 105.17 84.70
Month 4 86.36 65.93
Month 5 75.06 60.55
Month 6 99.79 65.32
Month 12 8.80 37.21
47Table IX: Bank Tail Risk Pricing for investment banks, foreign banks, and GSEs.
Notes: This table presents the estimates from OLS regression of monthly excess returns on a value-weighted index of commercial banks, investment
banks, and GSEs on the Fama-French stock factors, bond factors, and the second principal component weighted returns. The table also reports results
for individual banks. Foreign banks were selected based on the share-code in CRSP. Investment banks are those with SIC code 62. A share-code ending
in two indicates that ﬁrms were incorporated outside the US. For individual banks, the longest available sample for each bank till 2009 was selected.
The starting year for each bank is mentioned in parentheses under the name of the bank. PC2 is the time-series of the returns of the size-sorted
portfolios weighed by the loadings of the second principal component   w2. The weights of the second principal component have been re-normalized so
that they sum to 1. Statistical signiﬁcance is indicated by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The alphas have been annualized
by multiplying by 12 and are expressed in percentages. The standard errors were adjusted for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation using Newey-West
with 3 lags. The implicit subsidy is the risk price (38.93%) times (minus) loading on PC2). The risk price is ﬁxed in the diﬀerent subsamples.
Index of Banks Individual Banks
Commercial Investment Foreign GSE BoA Citi GS LEH ML MS WFC FNM FRE
Market Cap(Jan 05) 118.57 24.12 44.71 50.61 187.30 254.56 52.22 34.33 55.78 61.25 103.71 62.48 44.95
start (1973) (1986) (1999) (1994) (1971) (1986) (1970) (1970) (1989)
Panel A: Full Sample
market 0.83∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
smb 0.17∗∗ 0.14 0.36 -0.01 0.08 -0.17 0.21 -0.09 0.06 -0.15 -0.12 -0.07 0.38
hml 0.41∗∗∗ 0.13 0.54 0.16 0.56∗∗∗ 0.17 -0.28 -0.10 0.20 -0.12 0.39∗∗∗ 0.16 0.43∗∗
ltg 0.04 0.09 0.07 1.39∗∗∗ 0.08 -0.07 1.09 -0.08 -0.31 -0.16 -0.01 1.34∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
crd 0.26∗∗ -0.25 -1.24 -0.22 0.44 0.44 -0.66 0.91 0.37 -0.20 0.44∗ -0.15 -0.25
PC2 -0.06∗∗∗ -0.02 0.01 -0.05∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.07 -0.09∗ -0.02 -0.04∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
size 2.32 0.77 -0.38 1.95 3.12 1.94 2.57 3.43 0.70 1.47 3.27 1.83 3.94
Panel B: Subsamples
1990-2005
PC2 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02 -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.07 -0.09∗ -0.02 -0.04∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
size 2.58 1.13 0.84 3.57 3.17 2.18 2.57 3.43 0.61 1.55 4.40 3.39 4.06
2000-2005
PC2 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.16∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
size 4.76 2.59 2.23 6.07 4.53 4.59 2.53 6.22 1.61 4.12 6.15 6.57 5.37
4
8Table X: Announcement Dates
Dates for the pre-crisis announcements are from O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000). Dates for the crisis announcements are from the New York Fed Timeline
of the Financial Crisis.
+ All + large - large
Panel A: Pre-Crisis Bailout Announcement Dates
9/19/1984 Comptroller of Currency x
9/24/1998 LTCM x
9/15/1998 Brazilian Crisis x
10/08/1998 Brazilian Crisis x
11/13/1998 Brazilian Crisis x
11/14/1997 South Korean Crisis x
01/25/1995 Mexico Crisis
Panel B: Crisis Announcement Dates
2007/08/10 The FR provides liquidity x
2007/12/12 Term auction facility is announced x
2007/12/17 First Term auction takes place x
2007/12/21 Term auction facility is extended x
2008/03/11 Term securities lending facility is extended x
2008/03/14 Emergency lending from the Fed to Bear Stearns x x
2008/03/17 Bear Stearns is bought for $2 per share x
2008/03/17 Primary dealer credit facility is extended **delayed by a day* x x
2008/05/02 TSLF collateral eligibility is expanded x
2008/07/15 Paulson requests govnmt funds for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac x x
2008/07/30 84-day TAF auctions are introduced x
2008/09/15 Lehman ﬁles for bankruptcy x
2008/09/29 House votes down bailout plan x
2008/10/03 Revised plan passes House x
2008/10/06 TALF increased to $900 billion x
2008/10/14 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injection
2008/11/7 Bush Speech x
2008/11/13 TARP not used for buying troubled assets from banks x
2008/11/25 Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) x
2009/01/16 Treasury/ Federal Reserve and the FDIC Provide Assistance to Bank of America x x
2009/02/10 The FRB expands TALF to as much as $1 trillion x
2009/03/18 The FRB purchases up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities x
4
9Table XI: Bailout announcements
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression RTBTF
t −R
f
t = α+β1PC2+β2PC2D+ǫ. TBTF represents
the value-weighted return of the 10 banks that were announced to be by the Comptroller of Currency in September
of 1984. PC2 represents the daily return of the portfolio that goes long in small banks and shorts large banks.
The weights for the portfolio are given by the second principal component and sum to 1. D represents a dummy
variable that equals 1 after the announcement date and 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated over a 30-, 60-, 90-,
and a 105-day window around the announcement date. A 7-day window around the exact announcement date was
excluded from the sample while estimating coeﬃcients. Dates for the announcements are from O’Hara and Shaw
(1990) and Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000) .
Coeﬀ 30D 45D 60D 90D 105D
Panel A: Pre-crisis Announcements
9/19/1984; Comptroller of Currency
PC2 -0.19∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
PC2D -0.12∗ -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.00
9/24/1998; LTCM
PC2 -0.22∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
PC2D -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05∗
9/15/1998; Brazilian Crisis
PC2 -0.24∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
PC2D -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
10/08/1998; Brazilian Crisis
PC2 -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
PC2D -0.08∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗
11/13/1998; Brazilian Crisis
PC2 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
PC2D -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03
11/14/1997; South Korean Crisis
PC2 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
PC2D -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
01/25/1995; Mexico Crisis
PC2 -0.17∗ -0.11∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
PC2D -0.06 -0.12∗ -0.08 -0.05 -0.05
Pooled Regression
PC2 -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
PC2D -0.03∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
Panel B: Crisis Announcements
Positive Announcements: All Banks
PC2 -0.17∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
PC2D 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Positive Announcements: Large Banks
PC2 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
PC2D -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.02 -0.02 -0.03∗
Negative Announcements
PC2 -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
PC2D -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
50Table XII: Baseline model with levered normal and ﬁnancial disaster risk in the market
Calibrated version of model with Gaussian aggregate consumption growth shocks and two aggregate states. In Panel A, θ is 13.25 and α is 0.75. σ is
3% and   is 2%. In Panel B, θ is 15 and α is 0.75. σ is 3.5% and   is 2%. Results shown for 25,000 random draws.
λi Fi E[Ri,e|nd] E[Ri,e] E[Ri,e|exp] E[Ri,e|rec] αi|no dis. βi|no dis E[Ri,e|nd] E[Ri,e] E[Ri,e|exp] E[Ri,e|rec] αi|no dis. βi|no dis
Panel A: Baseline Model with Levered Normal and Financial Disaster risk in the Market
5% aggregate consumption drop 2.5% aggregate consumption drop
Market Market
2.5 0.95 5.80 4.09 3.49 5.64 4.21 3.33 3.19 3.71
Large Banks Large Banks
2 1.00 2.29 2.29 2.30 2.26 −0.63 0.59 2.44 2.44 2.45 2.43 −0.40 0.74
Small Banks Small Banks
2 0.90 7.11 4.18 3.18 6.78 0.71 0.98 6.19 3.28 2.79 4.59 1.30 0.93
2 0.80 12.54 6.16 3.98 11.87 2.22 1.41 10.23 4.16 3.09 6.95 3.21 1.12
2 0.75 15.49 7.19 4.35 14.64 3.07 1.63 12.53 4.60 3.23 8.20 4.25 1.23
2 0.70 18.61 8.25 4.69 17.56 3.96 1.86 14.81 5.05 3.36 9.49 5.31 1.33
2 0.65 21.88 9.33 5.01 20.63 4.88 2.10 17.17 5.51 3.48 10.81 6.44 1.43
2 0.60 27.63 10.43 5.31 23.84 5.92 2.36 19.59 5.96 3.60 12.17 7.56 1.53
Panel B: Baseline Model with Levered Normal and Unlevered Financial Disaster risk in the Market
5% aggregate consumption drop 2.5% aggregate consumption drop
Market Market
2.5 0.95 5.83 5.12 4.87 5.75 5.23 4.88 4.83 5.03
Large Banks Large Banks
2 1.00 3.59 3.59 3.61 3.53 −0.59 0.76 3.78 3.78 3.79 3.75 −0.20 0.78
3 1.00 5.54 5.54 5.58 5.45 −0.85 1.17 5.75 5.75 5.76 5.76 −0.36 1.20
4 5.54 5.54 5.58 5.45 −0.56 1.56
Small Banks Small Banks
2 0.90 10.5 5.80 4.68 8.74 2.32 0.89 7.69 4.76 4.19 6.24 2.05 0.84
2 0.80 14.63 8.13 5.63 14.64 5.48 1.03 12.02 5.77 4.55 8.96 4.56 0.89
2 0.75 17.84 9.35 6.09 17.87 7.23 1.11 14.33 6.28 4.71 10.40 5.86 0.93
2 0.70 21.24 10.62 6.51 21.31 9.03 1.19 16.73 6.81 4.87 11.90 7.21 0.97
1 0.70 10.32 5.27 3.34 10.34 4.50 0.56 8.33 3.43 2.47 5.94 3.71 0.46
1 0.65 12.13 5.98 3.62 12.17 5.57 0.60 9.66 3.74 2.58 6.77 4.50 0.47
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Figure 1: Covariances between risk adjusted returns and principal components
Each panel corresponds to a principal component. The upper left panel uses the ﬁrst principal component. The black ’X’ represent the average risk
adjusted returns for the 10 size-sorted portfolios of banks. Each blue circle represents a covariance between a given principal component and a given
bank portfolio. The covariances are re-scaled. The normal-risk-adjusted returns are annualized (multiplied by 12) and reported in percentage points.
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Figure 2: Size factor in normal risk-adjusted returns of commercial banks
The solid line plots the 12-month (backward looking) moving average (months t − 11 through t) of the time-series of the weighted sum of the residuals
from the OLS regression of monthly excess stock returns for each size-sorted portfolio of commercial banks on the Fama-French and bond risk factors.
The weights are given by the second principal component and sum to 1. The dashed line represents the growth of index of industrial production. The
gray-shaded regions represent NBER recessions and the light-shaded regions represent banking crisis. The NBER recession dates are published by the
NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee. The dates for the Mexico and LTCM crisis were obtained from Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000) and the FDIC
(for the Less-Developed-Country debt crisis of 1982). The left-axis references the moving average of the residuals and the right-axis references the index
of industrial production.
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Figure 3: Size factor in bank stocks and recessions
Notes: Simulation of 40 years. The full line is Return on smb; the dotted line is Return on market. θ is 15 and α
is 0.75. σ is 3.5% and   is 2%. Small bank leverage is 1 and FS = 0.65. Large bank leverage is 3 and FB = 1. The
shaded areas are recessions.
54Separate Appendix
A Derivation of Tail Risk Premium Expression
We use F to denote FC. Consider the investor’s Euler equation for asset i: Et[Mt+1Ri
t+1] = 1. The stand-in








We assume that the distribution of the Gaussian factors is (conditionally) independent of the realization of the
disaster:  







































t+1, which only reﬂects the eﬀect of the recovery rate on the
dividend growth realization. Using the deﬁnition of resilience ptEt[MD


















































t is the vector of multiple regression coeﬃcients in
regression of returns on the factors and λt is the vector of risk prices, and Rt = Et[MG
t+1]−1. Note that the variation
in the p/d ratios induced by the variation in the probability of a disaster does not co-vary with the normal risk
factors–by assumption– and hence is not priced in the normal risk premium. In addition, we assume that the
market price of Gaussian risk is constant λ and that the Gaussian factor betas βi
t are constant. In that case, the
expected return on asset i, conditional on no disaster realization, after adjusting for Gaussian risk exposure, becomes:
Et[  Ri
t+1] = exp(rt − hi
t), where Et[  Ri
t+1] = Et[R
G,i
t+1] − βiλ, and rt denotes logRt, and hi
t denotes log(1 + Hi
t).
55B Other Explanations
Business Cycle Variation in Common and Idiosyncratic Risk Finally, there are factors other
than ﬁnancial disasters that could explain the cyclicality in the size factor. Large idiosyncratic shocks can cause
bank failures. If the volatility of these shocks increases more in recessions for small banks, that could explain some
of our ﬁndings. Table XIII measures the standard deviation of normal-risk-adjusted returns at the portfolio level
(Panel A) and at the bank level (Panel B). The ﬁrst one measures the quantity of residual common risk. The
second one measures the quantity of residual idiosyncratic risk. The portfolio-level measure in Panel A is the time
series standard deviation of normal risk-adjusted returns, reported for NBER expansions and recessions separately.
The bank-level measure in panel B is the average over time of the cross-sectional standard deviation within each
portfolio of normal-risk-adjusted returns.
During recessions, the exposure of the largest banks to residual common risk increases from 14.2 to 21.6%. For
the smallest banks, the increase is only 3 percentage points. As expected, smaller banks are much more exposed to
idiosyncratic risk than large banks, but the amount of idiosyncratic risk exposure of small banks does not seem to
increase very much during recessions. The standard deviation ranges from 38% for the smallest banks to 26% for
the largest banks during recessions, and from 36% to 20% in the whole sample. However, the largest percentage
point increase in volatility during recessions is noted for the largest banks: from 20% to 26%. For the smallest
banks, the increase is less than two percentage points. There is no evidence to suggest that the cyclicality of the
size factor is due to idiosyncratic banks risk.
[Table 13 about here.]
Business Cycle Variation in Cash Flows We analyzed the data in the report for the ﬁrst three quarters
of 2001 which corresponds to the recession dates provided by NBER. During this period, small banks outperform
large banks on almost all 13 performance parameters measured. Small banks had a higher return-on-equity (14.00%
versus 13.80%), a higher return-on-assets (1.15 times that of large banks), a lower loan-loss-charge, a higher net-
interest-margin (4.34% versus 3.62%), and comparable cost-of-funds (approximately 3.75% for both). During this
recession, 70% of small banks and 60% of large banks reported earnings gains.
In 2008, large banks are again unable to match the performance of small banks on most measures. For the
ﬁrst-half 2008, small banks’ ROE is 1.5 times and yield-on-assets is 50 basis-point higher than corresponding values
for large banks. 14.16% of the 558 small banks and 26.72% of the 114 large banks were unproﬁtable. Finally, 41.22%
of small banks reported an earnings gain as compared to 24.14% of large banks.
For the full-year 2008, 28.70% of small banks and 40.35% of large banks reported losses. Small banks do have
lower return-on-assets and ROE for the full year, but it is not obvious if this is due to a higher cash ﬂow risk. During
second-half 2008, small banks not only earned a higher yield on assets and a higher net interest margin, but also
provisioned more conservatively for losses. The ratio of loan-loss provisions to assets increases to 1.93% for small
banks by 4Q 2008 from 0.76% during 1Q 2008 but this ratio hardly changes for the largest banks.
56C Additional Tables
[Table 14 about here.]
[Table 15 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
57Table XIII: Measuring residual risk exposure
Notes: This table presents the standard deviation of the residuals from the OLS regression of monthly excess returns of each size-sorted
portfolio of commercial banks on Fama-French factors and bond factors. In panel A the row labeled Recession computes the (time series)
standard deviation of the residuals during recession months and the row labeled Entire Sample computes the (time series) standard
deviation for the entire sample. In Panel B we examine the cross-sectional standard deviation of the residuals of banks in each bin for
each period t. Panel B reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional standard deviation for each bin. The row labeled Recession
lists the standard deviation of the residuals during recession months and the row labeled Entire sample lists the standard deviation for
the entire sample. The standard deviations have been annualized by multiplying by
√
12 and are expressed in percentages.
Panel A: Portfolios
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Recession 15.77 14.39 12.80 12.43 13.76 13.46 15.77 14.79 18.11 21.13
Entire Sample 13.18 11.92 11.43 10.54 10.93 11.17 11.38 10.96 11.95 14.26
Panel B: Individual Banks
Recession 38.40 30.94 32.45 28.86 30.33 27.61 27.48 28.05 26.01 25.54
Entire Sample 36.36 30.05 28.79 27.45 25.88 25.13 24.68 24.03 22.43 20.83
58Table XIV: NBER reference cycle peaks and banking panics
Notes: The dates of the banking panics were taken from Gorton (1988, p. 223) and Wicker (1996, p.155). Months before peak and
Months after peak indicate the number of months relative to the peak when the banking crisis occurs.
Peak Trough Panic Months before peak Months after peak
October 1873 March 1879 September 1873 1
March 1882 May 1885 May 1884 17
July 1890 May 1891 November 1890 4
January 1893 June 1894 February 1893 1
December 1895 June 1897 October 1896 10
May 1907 June 1908 October 1907 5
January 1913 December 1914 August 1914 20
August 1929 March 1933 October-November 1930 19
September-October 1931
February-March 1933
July 1981 November 1982 February-July 1982 8
December 2007 September-December 2008 9
59Table XV: Coeﬃcients for the cross-sectional regression of annual returns on size as measured by
market capitalization
Notes: Pooled regression. The dependent variable is the annual return for each individual bank in our sample. The independent
variables are the market capitalization of the bank, the book to market value for the bank, the book value of the bank, and the leverage
of the bank. All variables are at date t. Statistical signiﬁcance is indicated by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
The standard errors were adjusted for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation using Newey-West with 3 lags. Annual data. The sample
is 1970-2005.






adj − R2 0.0038 0.0004
















































































Figure 4: Size factor in normal risk-adjusted returns of all banks
The solid line plots the 12-month (backward looking) moving average (months t −11 through t) of the time-series of the weighted sum of the residuals from the OLS regression of
monthly excess stock returns for each size-sorted portfolio of all ﬁnancial ﬁrms on the Fama-French and bond risk factors. The weights are given by the second principal component
and sum to 1. The dashed line represents the growth of index of industrial production. The dates are indicated on the x-axis. The left-axis references the moving average of the
residuals and the right-axis references the index of industrial production.
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1